It’s not necessary to believe in aliens

In light of recent U.S. news about unidentified flying objects being shot down, whether or not I believe in aliens has been a subject that has come up.

Part of my perspective on belief is that I do think there is a big difference between beliefs that are statements of value and beliefs that are statements of prediction/faith. There’s a big difference between me saying I believe commodification of social media is evil (i.e., that the things I see happening with social media are creating a world I find distasteful) and me saying I believe commodification of social media is going to destroy democracy (i.e., that the things I see happening with social media are going to have consequences that are distasteful). While the line between them is thin, I do think there is a line. While one could certainly argue that my belief that a lot of social media is bad is a function of my predictions and causal beliefs about the effects of social media, more fundamentally, it still comes down to believing those outcomes are bad, at some root. I believe that auto-filters on Instagram are evil, and sure, someone could argue that it is because I have a causal belief in these filters contributing to poor mental health outcomes. But fundamentally, I think that self-esteem, joy, and the avoidance of poor mental health are valuable for people’s lives, especially children, and therefore, there are some inherent value propositions under-girding this belief.

However, I do think there are some beliefs that I think are purely predictions about what will happen or assumptions about information we do not have access to at the moment. For these things, it is not required to have a belief at all. Believing in God or believing it is safe to take your COVID mask off or believing someone running for office will win the election are beliefs that I often think would be more helpful if considered probabilistically.

For example, do I believe in aliens? I personally am not aware of/have not been exposed to enough evidence or theory that leads me to believe that aliens definitely exist. So I dedicate zero mental energy to thinking about aliens as if they exist, particularly because almost nothing I do is affected by whether they exist or not. Some might argue that this statement means that I don’t believe in aliens, whereas I am more so saying I don’t think making a decision on whether aliens exist is, personally, necessary or possible under current circumstances.

However, I also know there are people (scientists, astronauts, etc.) that do sometimes need to make decisions that necessitate assuming aliens do or do not exist. And for those folks, I think the probability of aliens existing is high enough and the risk of harm of being wrong about assuming they exist is low enough (and risk in the other direction is high enough) that I’m very comfortable saying we should assume they do exist. I don’t think this is the same as me saying I believe in aliens, for whatever “belief” means to people. Rather I just think for the sake of those limited decisions where their existence matters for our choices, I think it’s just more practical to go with those that are designed to accommodate alien life.

I am not claiming this stance is purely logical, in the rational choice definition. My assessment of the probabilities and risks is fully a function of my experiences, values, and life story. Pascal’s wager, which is the argument that belief in God is the rational best choice, arguably takes a similar stance. However, I am not someone who believes in God. That is because the underlying premises of Pascal’s wager regarding the benefits gained if God exists (and harms of not being a believer if he does) do not feel particularly tenable to me. Why? Reasons include the spiritual experiences I’ve had in my own life, feeling that the harm done by Christian religion is a more salient concern, doubts about whether those premises supported even by those with more involvement in Christian philosophy, etc. None of these are objective bases, and that’s fine.

The reason I think the distinction between values-driven beliefs and prediction-driven beliefs is useful is because while information and research can certainly inform the former, the role of empirical inquiry for the latter is even more important. I, personally, find it very frustrating to sit in meetings when things are about prediction, particularly when attached to areas where I am fully aware that there are large bodies of research and evidence, are treated like matters of moral philosophy. This is not to say that I believe there is always an easy “truth” to find that can solve any current conundrum, but I do feel that often, people treat certain things as inscrutable and only subject to thought experiment, which contributes, I think, to a kind of willing disengagement from research.